Questions We Want You to Ask

Fine. Your commitment is to deliver your agreed ecological plan and to maintain Bronze-level stewardship. Engagement — mentoring, committee work, public-facing activity — is recognised at Silver and Gold via the contribution multiplier, but it is not a condition of scheme membership. A quiet delivering member in good standing is a full and respected member.

Audit is a condition of the Trustmark. Without audit there is no Trustmark. Without Trustmark there is no premium market access and no tier multipliers on surplus distribution. But the audit is designed to be proportionate — Bronze audit is fundamentally a delivery-plan check with some stewardship-practice sampling. It is not a corporate intrusion. The Audit and Standards Committee (EQM-chaired) is explicitly designed not to feel like DEFRA policing or Red Tractor inspection. If audit feels wrong to you in principle, this scheme is not the right scheme for your holding. This is a legitimate position; there will be no pressure to change it.

Ask Phil (or the YWT lead) directly by phone or email. No question is logged as a weakness. The scheme documents are written as best we can but if something doesn't land, that's a problem with the writing, not with the reader. We will fix the writing. There is also a private "ask anything" channel commitment in Article 13 of the sample governance document — this is a standing practice for the 20 years, not just for the pre-workshop period.

Three answers: The financial case for joining the scheme rests primarily on DEFRA funding, premium market access via the Trustmark, shared-services savings, and brand-equity protection — not on surplus distribution. Surplus share is an addition, not the core. The surplus model will be consortium-adopted. If the model agreed doesn't feel fair to you, say so at the 30 April workshop. You will not be alone if you do. Models are reviewed at Year 5 and can be adjusted by consortium vote. Nothing is fixed forever.

The scheme's financial model does not depend on the trustmark producing large revenues. Trustmark revenue is modelled conservatively; the scheme is viable on DEFRA funding, shared-services savings, and blended private finance alone. The trustmark's primary value is recognition and market access, not revenue. If the trustmark underperforms commercially, tier recognition still carries internal value for surplus distribution and scheme governance.

The scheme is designed so that individual exits do not destabilise it. DEFRA funding adjusts pro rata; surplus pools re-balance pro rata; scheme reserves (if Model E or E-hybrid adopted) absorb shocks. Your delivery plan and payments are unaffected by another holding's exit.

No scheme is immune to failure. Protections in the governance document include: orderly wind-down provisions (Article 12); no personal liability for landowner members beyond scheme's contractual position; delivered restoration on your holding belongs to you — it does not unwind if the scheme ends; DEFRA Landscape Recovery obligations are held at scheme level, not personal level. If the scheme needs to wind down in Year 8 or Year 15, your holding retains what has been restored, the trustmark recognition earned, and the market relationships built. What ceases is the forward commitment.

DEFRA Landscape Recovery is a 20-year commitment. The terms can change — policy change, government change, budget change all possible. The scheme's response: scheme reserves provide 12–24 months of operating buffer; private finance and premium market revenue reduce DEFRA dependency over time; the Consortium retains the right to renegotiate with DEFRA at inflection points; if DEFRA materially alters terms, scheme enters consultation with members; adjustment by consortium vote. The scheme is not wholly reliant on DEFRA by Year 5 in the financial forecasts. This is a design feature, not an accident.

You can sell at any time. What happens to scheme membership depends on the new owner: if the new owner wants to join the scheme on the same terms — smooth transfer, your historical delivery credit transfers to the holding (not the person); if the new owner does not want to join — you exit the scheme on sale; the holding leaves with you; no restoration claw-back on delivered work; if the new owner wants different terms — case-by-case negotiation at Audit and Standards Committee; not automatic. The goal is not to lock you in; the goal is to be clear.

The governance document is designed to survive leadership changes. The scheme's governance obligations are institutional, not personal. Whoever leads YWT in Year 10 is bound by the same governance document as whoever leads in Year 1. Options 2, 3, and 4 structurally separate the scheme from YWT's broader organisational decisions.

No — not from land within the scheme boundary. DEFRA's December 2024 guidance means land enrolled in Landscape Recovery cannot also generate BNG units for sale. This is a hard prohibition, not just a double-counting question. If you have land outside the scheme boundary, BNG remains fully available on those parcels. The Biodiversity Net Gain page in Points to Consider has full detail.

Probably yes, but this is not yet confirmed for Ure Dales specifically. The Peatland Code and Woodland Carbon Code operate in a different regulatory space from BNG, and DEFRA's general stacking guidance supports combining LRS payments with voluntary carbon credits where there is no double-counting. We are seeking confirmation for Ure Dales. If confirmed, the proposed framework gives 87% of carbon credit income to the originating landowner, with 3% to the SLE and 10% shared among all partners. See carbon credits and stacking guidance in Points to Consider.

It's the proposed Environmental Credits Protocol — a framework for distributing income from carbon credits and other environmental credits generated within the scheme. 87% goes to the landowner whose land generated the credit. 3% goes to the SLE to cover running costs. 10% is shared among all scheme partners, weighted by their trustmark score. This protocol needs to be agreed by the consortium before it can operate. See the Income Treatment Reference for the full picture.

One of two options: Proxy attendance — a named representative attends on your behalf. They carry your vote. You can watch a recording afterwards and ratify or override your proxy at Day 14. Absence with prior input — you submit your position in writing before the workshop; it is read out; you ratify or adjust at Day 14. Neither costs you standing. The 14-day ratification period specifically exists so that the workshop doesn't create permanent decisions in a single afternoon.

Decisions are taken by consent, not majority. Consent means "I can live with this" — a higher bar than voting and a lower bar than consensus. If you cannot live with a decision, you can register dissent and the decision does not proceed without resolution. If resolution fails, the dispute pathway (Article 11) engages: dialogue first, ASC Appeals panel second, external mediator third.

This is common. The Family Conversation Guide in the pre-workshop pack is designed specifically for this. The scheme asks for one clear answer per holding: yes, no, or not yet. How the family reaches that answer is private. Phil is available for family conversations, on the holding or otherwise, before 30 April.

Then "not yet" is a real answer. The 14-day ratification period is designed for exactly this. Further extension is available if that is not long enough. Silence is not consent. The absence of a clear yes is treated as "not yet", not as agreement by default. The scheme proceeds with the ratifying members and leaves the door open for later joining on equivalent terms.